Strategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists, by Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W.
 17‐833	
	
	
	
“Strategic	Behavior	of	Moralists	and	Altruists”	
	
	
	
Ingela	Alger	and	Jörgen	W.	Weibull	
August	2017	
Strategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists
Ingela Algerand Jörgen W. Weibully
August 27, 2017z
Abstract. Does altruism and morality lead to socially better outcomes
in strategic interactions than selshness? We shed some light on this complex
and non-trivial issue by examining a few canonical strategic interactions played
by egoists, altruists and moralists. By altruists we mean people who do not
only care about their own material payo¤s but also about those to others,
and by a moralist we mean someone who cares about own material payo¤ and
also about what would be his or her material payo¤ if others were to act like
himself or herself. It turns out that both altruism and morality may improve
or worsen equilibrium outcomes, depending on the nature of the game. Not
surprisingly, both altruism and morality improve the outcomes in standard
public goods games. In innitely repeated games, however, both altruism and
morality may diminish the prospects of cooperation, and to di¤erent degrees. In
coordination games, morality can eliminate socially ine¢ cient equilibria while
altruism cannot.
Keywords: altruism, morality, Homo moralis, repeated games, coordina-
tion games
JEL codes: C73, D01, D03.
1. Introduction
Few humans are motivated solely by their private gains. Most have more complex
motivations, usually including some moral considerations, a concern for fairness or an
element of altruism or even spite or envy towards others. There can even be a concern
for the well-being of ones peer group, community, country or even humankind. By
contrast, for a long time almost all of economics was based on the premise of narrow
self-interest, by and large following the lead of Adam Smiths Inquiry into the Nature
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and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). But also Adam Smith himself thought
humans in fact have more complex and often social concerns and motives, a theme
developed in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759).1 Philosophers still argue how
to reconcile the themes of these two books in the mind of one and the same author.
Did Adam Smith change his mind between the rst and second book? Or was his
position in his second book to demonstrate that well-functioning markets would result
in benecial results for society at large even if all individuals were to act only upon
their own narrow self interest?
In view of the overwhelming experimental evidence that only a minority of people
behave in accordance with predictions based on pure material self interest, it appears
relevant to ask whether and how alternative preferences a¤ect outcomes in standard
economic interactions. It is commonly believed that if an element of altruism or
morality were added to economic agentsself-interest, then outcomes would improve
for all. Presumably, people would not cheat when trading with each other, they
would work hard even when not monitored or remunerated by way of bonus schemes.
They would contribute to public goods, respect and defend the interests of others,
and might even be willing to risk their lives to save the lives of others.
While this has certainly proved to be right in some interactions,2 this belief is
not generally valid. For example, Lindbeck and Weibull (1988) demonstrate that
altruism can diminish welfare among strategically interacting individuals engaged in
intertemporal decision-making. The reason is that if interacting individuals are aware
of each othersaltruism, then even altruists will to some extent exploit each others
altruism, resulting in misallocation of resources. One prime example is under-saving
for ones old age, in the rational expectation that others will help if need be. In this
example everyone would benet from commitment not to help each other; as this
could induce intertemporally optimal saving.
Likewise, Bernheim and Stark (1988) show that altruism may be harmful to long-
run cooperation. There, the reason is that in repeated games between altruists,
punishments from defection may be less harsh if the punisher is altruistic  just
like a loving parent who cannot credibly threaten misbehavior by a child with even a
mild punishment. Specically, in repeated interactions the mere repetition of a static
Nash equilibrium in the stage game has better welfare properties between altruists
1Edgeworth (1881) also included such concerns in his original model formulation (see Collard,
1975).
2Thus, Becker (1976) shows that an altruistic family head is benecial for the rest of the family,
even if other family members are selsh (see also Bergstrom, 1989). More recently, Bourlès, Bra-
moullé, and Perez-Richet (2017) show that altruism is benecial for income sharing in networks.
Regarding morality, La¤ont (1975) shows how an economy with Kantian individuals achieves e¢ -
ciency. More recently, Brekke, Kverndokk, and Nyborg (2003) show that a certain kind of moral
concerns enhances e¢ ciency in the private provision of public goods.
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than between purely self-interested individuals, thus diminishing the punishment from
defecting from cooperation. However, altruism also diminishes the temptation to
defect in the rst place, since defecting harms the other party. Bernheim and Stark
(1988) show that the net e¤ect of altruism may be to diminish the potential for
cooperation in the sense that it diminishes the range of discount factors that enables
cooperation as a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome.
The aim of the present study is to examine strategic interactions between altruists,
as well as between moralists, more closely, in order to shed light on the complex and
non-trivial e¤ects of altruism and morality on equilibrium behavior and the associated
material welfare. By altruismwe here mean that an individual cares not only about
own material welfare but also about the material welfare of others, in line with Becker
(1974,1976), Andreoni (1988), Bernheim and Stark (1988), and Lindbeck and Weibull
(1988). As for moralitywe rely on recent results in the literature on preference
evolution, results which show that a certain class, called Homo moralis preferences,
stands out as being particularly favored by natural selection (Alger and Weibull,
2013, 2016). A holder of such preferences maximizes a weighted sum of own material
payo¤ and own material payo¤ evaluated at hypothetical strategy proles in which
some or all of the other players strategies have been replaced by the individuals own
strategy.3
We examine the e¤ects of altruism and such morality for behavior and outcomes
in static and repeated interactions. Some of the results may appear surprising and
counter-intuitive. We also show similarities and di¤erences between altruism and
morality, the main di¤erence between these two motivations being due to the fact
that while the rst is purely consequentialistic, the second is partly deontological. In
other words, the rst motivation is only concerned with resulting material allocations,
the second places some weight on dutyor the moral value of acts, a concern about
what is the right thing to doin the situation at hand.
Our study complements other theoretical analyses of the e¤ects of pro-social pref-
erences and/or moral values on the qualitative nature of equilibrium outcomes in
a variety of strategic interactions. In economics, see Arrow (1973), Becker (1974),
Andreoni (1988, 1990), Bernheim (1994), Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Bénabou and Tirole (2006), Alger and Renault (2007),
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008), Englmaier and Wambach (2010), Dufwenberg et
al. (2011), and Sarkisian (2017). For related models of social norms, see Young
(1993), Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), Sethi and Somanathan (1996), Bicchieri
(1997), Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull (1999), Huck, Kübler, and Weibull (2012),
3This is certainly not the only way morality can be modeled. See Bergstrom (2009) for math-
ematical representations of several well-known moral maxims for pairwise interactions. See also
Gauthier (1986), Binmore (1994), Bacharach (1999), Sugden (2003), and Roemer (2006).
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and Myerson and Weibull (2015).4
Our study also complements a large literature on theoretical analyses of the evolu-
tion of behaviors in populations. For recent contributions, see Lehmann and Rousset
(2012), Van Cleve and Akçay (2013), Allen and Tarnita (2014), Ohtsuki (2014), Peña,
Nöldeke, and Lehmann (2015), and Berger and Grüne (2016). For surveys of related
work on agent-based simulation models, see Szabó and Borsos (2016) and Perc et al.
(2017).
In the next section we dene the three classes of preferences that we study, and
review some known results. We then turn to studying repeated interactions (Section
3), and coordination games (Section 4), and nally conclude.
2. Definitions and preliminaries
We consider n-player normal-form games (for any n > 1) in which each player has
the same set X of (pure or mixed) strategies, and  (x;y) 2 R is the material payo¤
to strategy x 2 X when used against strategy prole y 2 Xn 1 for the other players.
By material payo¤we mean the tangible consequences of playing the game, dened
in terms of the individuals monetary gains (or losses), or, more generally, his or
her indirect consumption utility from these gains (or losses). We assume  to be
aggregative in the sense that  (x;y) is invariant under permutation of the components
of y. The strategy set X is taken to be a non-empty, compact and convex set in some
normed vector space.
We say that an individual is purely self-interested, or a Homo oeconomicus if he
only cares about his own material payo¤, so that his utility is
u (xi;x i) =  (xi;x i) 8 (xi;x i) 2 Xn:
An individual is an altruist if he cares about his own material payo¤ and also
attaches a weight, his or her degree of altruism  2 [0; 1], to the material payo¤s to
others, so that his utility is:
v (xi;x i) =  (xi;x i) +  
X
j 6=i
 (xj;x j) 8 (xi;x i) 2 Xn: (1)
Finally, an individual is a Homo moralis if he cares about his own material payo¤
and also attaches a weight to what his material payo¤ would be should others use
the same strategy as him. Formally, the utility to a Homo moralis with degree of
morality  2 [0; 1] is
w (xi;x i) = E


 
xi; ~x
m
 i

; (2)
where ~xm i is a random (n  1)-vector such that with probability m (1  )n m 1
exactly m 2 f0; :::; n  1g of the n   1 components of x i are replaced by xi, while
4For a recent comprehensive textbook treatment of behavioral economics, see Dhami (2016).
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the remaining components of x i keep their original values (for each m, there are 
n 1
m

ways to replace m of the n   1 components of x i). For instance, writing xj
and xk for the strategies of is two opponents when n = 3:
w (xi; xj; xk) = (1  )2  (xi; xj; xk) +  (1  ) (xi; xi; xk) (3)
+ (1  ) (xi; xj; xi) + 2 (xi; xi; xi) :
We observe that a Homo oeconomicus can be viewed as an altruist with degree of
altruism  = 0, and as a Homo moralis with degree of morality  = 0.
Our purpose is to compare equilibria of interactions in which all individuals are
altruists with interactions in which all individuals are moralists. We are interested
both in the equilibrium behaviors as well as in the material welfare properties of
these equilibria. We will use G to refer to the n-player game between altruists with
common degree of altruism , with payo¤ functions dened in (1), and   to refer to
the n-player game between Homo moralis with common degree of morality , with
payo¤ functions dened in (2).
2.1. Necessary rst-order conditions. Consider a simple public goods game,
with
 (xi;x i) =

xi +
X
j 6=i
xj
1=2
  x2i ; (4)
where xi  0 is is contribution to the public good. Assume further that X = R.
It turns out that in this interaction equilibria in   coincide with those in G when
 = .
More generally, for interactions in which the strategy set X is an interval and 
is continuously di¤erentiable, any interior symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy x in
game G, for any 0   < 1, satises the rst-order condition
@ (xi;x i)
@xi

x1=:::=xn=x
+ (n  1)  @ (xi;x i)
@xn

x1=:::=xn=x
= 0: (5)
(By permutation invariance of , all partial derivatives with respect to other players
strategies are identical). Moreover, (5) is also necessary for an interior strategy x to
be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy in the same interaction between moralists,
  for  =  (Alger and Weibull, 2016). Higher-order conditions may di¤er, however,
so that the set of symmetric equilibria do not necessarily coincide. Nevertheless, in
the above public good example they do coincide.5
Figure 1 shows the unique symmetric Nash-equilibrium contribution in the public
goods game between moralists,  , as a function of community size n, for di¤erent
5See also Bergstrom (1995) for an example for  = 1=2 and n = 2.
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degrees of morality, with higher curves for higher degrees of morality. This is also the
unique symmetric Nash-equilibrium contribution in the public goods game between
altruists, G, when the degree of altruism is the same as the degree of morality,  = .
Hence, the behavioral e¤ects of morality and altruism are here indistinguishable.
Figure 1: The unique Nash equilibrium contribution in the public-goods game for
di¤erent degrees of morality.
2.2. Two-by-two games. We now briey consider symmetric one-shot two-by-
two games, with ij denoting the material payo¤ accruing to a player using pure
strategy i = 1; 2 against pure strategy j = 1; 2. For mixed strategies, let x; y 2 [0; 1]
denote the playersprobabilities for using pure strategy 1. The expected material
payo¤ from using mixed strategy x against mixed strategy y is bilinear:
 (x; y) = 11xy + 12x (1  y) + 21 (1  x) y + 22 (1  x) (1  y) :
In such an interaction, an altruists utility function is still bilinear:
v (x; y) = 11xy + 12x (1  y) + 21 (1  x) y + 22 (1  x) (1  y) (6)
+  [11xy + 12y (1  x) + 21 (1  y)x+ 22 (1  x) (1  y)] ;
while a Homo moralis has a utility function with quadratic terms:
w (x; y) = (1  )  [11xy + 12x (1  y) + 21 (1  x) y + 22 (1  x) (1  y)](7)
+  11x2 + (12 + 21)x (1  x) + 22 (1  x)2 :
Depending on whether the sum of the diagonal elements of the payo¤ matrix,
11 + 22, exceeds, equals, or falls short of the sum of the o¤-diagonal elements,
12 + 21, the utility of Homo moralis is either strictly convex, linear, or strictly
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concave in his own mixed strategy, x. Hence, the set of symmetric equilibria of  
typically di¤ers from that of G even when  = .6
As an illustration, consider a prisoners dilemma with the rst pure strategy rep-
resenting cooperate, that is, payo¤s 21 > 11 > 22 > 12. Using the standard
notation 11 = R, 12 = S, 21 = T and 22 = P , it is easy to verify that coop-
eration, that is, the strategy pair (1; 1), is a Nash equilibrium in   if and only if
   where
 =
T  R
T   P ; (8)
and that it is a Nash equilibrium in G if and only if   , where
 =
T  R
R  S : (9)
We note that 8<:
 <  if R  S > T   P
 =  if R  S = T   P
 >  if R  S < T   P
In other words, it takes less altruism to turn cooperation into an equilibrium than it
takes morality when the payo¤ loss R S inicted upon an opponent by defecting
which an altruist cares about exceeds the di¤erence between the own payo¤ gain
T from defecting unilaterally and from defecting together, P , a payo¤ di¤erence a
moralist cares about. The reverse is true when R  S < T   P .
We next turn to exploring unchartered territories, by studying repeated interac-
tions (Section 3) and coordination (Section 4).
3. Repetition
We analyze innite repetition of two distinct classes of interaction: prisonersdilem-
mas and sharing games, respectively.
3.1. Repeated prisonersdilemmas. Consider an innitely repeated prisoners
dilemma with payo¤s as above and with a common discount factor  2 (0; 1). We will
provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for grim trigger (that is, cooperate until
someone defects, otherwise defect forever), if used by both players, to constitute a
subgame-perfect equilibrium that sustains perpetual cooperation.7 We do this rst
for a pair of equally altruistic players, then for a pair of equally moral players, and
nally compare the ability to sustain cooperation of altruists with that of moralists.
6For a complete characterization of the set of symmetric equilibria in two-by-two games between
moralists, see Alger and Weibull (2013).
7An analysis of more general repeated-games strategies falls outside the scope of this paper.
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If played by two equally altruistic individuals with degree of altruism , the stage-
game utilities to the row player are the following (see (6)):
C D
C (1 + )R S + T
D T + S (1 + )P
Grim trigger, if used by both players, constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium
that sustains perpetual cooperation if
(1 + )R  (1  )  (T + S) +  (1 + )P (10)
and
  P   S
T   P : (11)
The rst inequality makes one-shot deviations from cooperation unprotable. The
left-hand side is the per-period payo¤ obtained if both players always cooperate.
If one player defects, he gets the temptation utility T + S once, and then the
punishment payo¤ (1 + )P forever thereafter. Inequality (10) compares the present
value of continued cooperation with the present value from a one-shot deviation. The
second inequality, (11), makes a one-shot deviation from non-cooperation (play of
(D;D)) unprotable; this inequality is necessary for the threat to play D following
defection to be credible. For further use below, we note that (10) can be written more
succinctly as a condition on , or the playerspatience, namely as,   A, where
A =
T  R   (R  S)
T   P    (P   S) : (12)
Furthermore, denote by  the threshold value for  dened by (11).
In sum, a pair of equally altruistic players can sustain perpetual cooperation
either if altruism is strong enough,    (see (9)), in which case (C;C) is a Nash
equilibrium of the stage game and hence needs no threat to be sustained, or if players
are selsh enough to credibly punish defection,   min f; g, and players are
patient enough to prefer the long-term benets from cooperation than the immediate
reward from defection,   A. In the intermediate case, that is, when  <  < ,
cooperation is not sustainable for any discount factor  2 [0; 1].
For example, suppose that T = 10 and S = 0. If R = 8 and P = 4, then  = 1=4
and  = 2=3 > . In this case, cooperation is sustainable for any discount factor
if   1=4, and for any su¢ ciently high discount factor (  (1  4) = (3  2))
if  < 1=4. By contrast, if R = 6 and P = 2,  = 2=3 and  = 1=4. In this
case, cooperation is sustainable for any discount factor if altruism is strong (  2=3)
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and for any su¢ ciently high discount factor (  (2  3) = (4  )) if altruism is
weak (  1=4), but cooperation is not sustainable at all for intermediate degrees of
altruism (1=4 <  < 2=3).
Turning now to moralists, the stage-game utilities to a row player with degree of
morality  are given in (7), so we now have
C D
C R (1  )S + R
D (1  )T + P P
Comparison with the utility matrix for altruists reveals that while an altruist who
defects internalizes the pain inicted on the opponent, and is thus sensitive to the
value S, a moralist who defects internalizes the consequence of his action should both
choose to defect simultaneously, and is thus sensitive to the value P . Following the
same logic as above, grim trigger sustains perpetual cooperation between two equally
moral individuals as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if   K , where
K =
T  R   (T   P )
T   P    (T   P ) ; (13)
and   , where
 =
P   S
R  S : (14)
In sum, a pair of equally moral players can sustain perpetual cooperation either if
   (see (8)), in which case (C;C) is an equilibrium of the stage game and the
threat to punish by playing D is not necessary to sustain cooperation in the repeated
interaction, or if   min f; g and   K .
We now turn to comparing a pair of selsh players to a pair of altruists or a pair of
moralists. For selsh players, grim trigger constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium
that sustains perpetual cooperation if   0, where
0 =
T  R
T   P : (15)
Since 0 2 (0; 1) for any values of T , R, and P , and since 0 > max fA; Kg for
any  > 0 and  > 0, we conclude the following. First, conditional on the threat to
punish defectors being credible (i.e.,    and   , respectively), altruists and
moralists are better at sustaining cooperation than selsh individuals. Second, selsh
individuals are better at sustaining cooperation than altruists (resp. moralists) if the
latter cannot credibly threaten to punish defectors (i.e.,  >  resp.  > ).
Finally, comparing a pair of equally altruistic players with degree of altruism
 2 [0; 1] to a pair of equally moral players with degree of morality  = , does one
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pair face a more stringent challenge to sustain cooperation than the other? To answer
this question, we distinguish three cases, depending on whether T   R exceeds, falls
short of, or equals P   S.
Suppose rst that T   R = P   S. Observe rst that this implies  =  =
 =  (where  was dened in (9) and  in (8)). In other words, (C;C) is an
equilibrium of the stage game between altruists whenever it is an equilibrium of the
stage game between moralists. Moreover, whenever (C;C) is not an equilibrium of the
stage game, altruists and moralists are equally capable of credibly threatening to play
D following a defection, so that both altruists and moralists can sustain cooperation
if su¢ ciently patient. However, it is easy to verify that T   R = P   S implies
K > A: thus, if  2 [A; K), grim trigger constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium
that sustains perpetual cooperation for the altruists but not for the moralists.
Second, suppose that T  R > P  S. Observe rst that this implies  > : this
means that if    < , then (C;C) is an equilibrium of the stage game between
moralists but not of the stage game between altruists. Since T  R > P   S implies
 > ,  <  and  < , the conclusion is as follows. When T  R > P  S
there exist values of  for which altruists are not able to sustain cooperation for
any discount factor , whereas a pair of moralists with any degree of morality  can
sustain perpetual cooperation; namely, for any  2 [0; 1] if   , and for all   K
if  < .
Finally, suppose that T  R < P  S. Then it is straightforward to verify that the
opposite conclusion obtains, namely that there exist degrees of morality  for which
moralists are not able to sustain cooperation for any , whereas a pair of altruists
with arbitrary degree of altruism can sustain perpetual cooperation (for any  2 [0; 1]
if   , and for all   A if  < ).
3.2. Repeated sharing. The observation that it may be harder for altruists than
for egoists to sustain cooperation in an innitely repeated game was pointed out by
Bernheim and Stark (1988, section II.B). We rst recapitulate their model. We then
carry through the same analysis for Homo moralis, and nally compare the two. The
stage-game is the same as used by Bernheim and Stark, and represents sharing of
consumption goods.
Altruism. The stage game is a two-player simultaneous-move game in which
each players strategy set is X = [0; 1  ] for some small  > 0. If player 1 chooses
x 2 X and player 2 chooses y 2 X, payo¤s are
v1 (x; y) = [x (1  y)] + 1  [(1  x) y]
for player 1, and
v2 (x; y) = [y (1  x)] + 2  [(1  y)x]
Strategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists 11
for player 2, where 0 <  < 1=2.8 A necessary rst-order condition for an interior
Nash equilbrium is thus 
1  y
y

= 1 

1  x
x
 1
;
and likewise for player 2. Bernheim and Stark consider the symmetric case when
1 = 2 = , in which case the rst-order condition is their equation (16).9 They use
this to identify the following unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the stage game
x = y = xA:
xA = min

1
1 + 
; 1  

:
They compare this with the unique symmetric Pareto optimum, xC = 1=2, the solu-
tion of
max
x2X
[x (1  x)] +   [(1  x)x] :
The utility evaluated at the stage-game equilibrium is vNE = (1 + )  [xA (1  xA)]
and the utility evaluated at the Pareto-optimal strategy pair is vC = (1 + )  4 .
Bernheim and Stark consider an innitely repeated play of this stage game, with
discount factor  2 (0; 1). They note that perpetual play of cooperation, (xC ; xC),
is sustained in subgame perfect equilibrium by the threat of (perpetual) reversion to
(xA; xA) i¤   A, where
A =
vD   vC
vD   vNE , (16)
where vD is the maximal utility from a one-shot deviation from cooperation, that is,
vD = max
x2X
1
2
[x +   (1  x)] :
Solving this maximization problem, we nd that a player who would optimally deviate
from cooperation would play
xD = min

1=( 1)
1 + 1=( 1)
; 1  

:
8This is the special case when k = 1 in Bernheim and Stark (1988).
9Bernheim and Stark instead use the utility specication
v = (1  )  [x (1  y)] +   [(1  x) y] ;
with  2 [0; 1=2]. Hence our behavioral predictions coincide with theirs if one substitutes  by
= (1  ).
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Noting that for  = 1, xD = 1=2 and vD = 2  4  = vC , we observe that pure
altruists do not benet from deviation. Hence, pure altruists can sustain cooperation
irrespective of .10
Bernheim and Stark proceed by considering a numerical example,  = 0:01 and
 = 1=4, and nd that the lowest discount factor  then needed to sustain cooperation
is strictly increasing with . In other words, altruism makes cooperation harder. We
proceed in parallel with them by setting  = 0:01,  = 1=4 and/  > 0:05. Then
xA = 1= (1 + ),
vA =  (1 + )1 2 ;
and
xD =
1
1 + 1=(1 )
for all  above approximately 0.05. Figure 2 shows that indeed xD  1    = 0:99
for such values of .
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
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xD
Figure 2: The optimal one-shot deviation for altruists in the repeated game.
For such ,
vD = 2   1 + 1=( 1)1  :
Hence,
A =

1 + 1=(1 )
1    (1 + )  2 
[1 + 1=(1 )]1    (1 + )1 2 (2) :
Figure 3 shows A as a function of  when  = 1=4, for 0:05 <  < 1. In particular,
as  ! 1, both the nominator and denominator in the denition tend to zero. By
lHopitals rule, A !  1 as ! 1.
10As we will see, a discontinuity will appear in this respect when ! 1.
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Figure 3: The critical discount factor for cooperation between altruists in the
repeated game.
These numerical results agree with those reported in Table 1 in Bernheim and Stark
(1988), when keeping in mind that our altruism parameter  is a transformation of
theirs (see footnote 9 above). In this numerical example, a pair of Homo oeconomi-
cus ( = 0), can sustain cooperation only if  & 0:25. Altruism thus here has an
economically signicant negative impact on the ability to sustain cooperation, since
even a small degree of altruism, such as  = 1=9, raises the discount factor needed
for cooperation by 40%.
Morality. We begin by considering the stage-game. The stage game is again
a two-player simultaneous-move game in which each players strategy set is X =
[0; 1  ] for some small  > 0. If player 1 chooses x 2 X and player 2 chooses
y 2 X, payo¤s are
w1 (x; y) = (1  1)  [x (1  y)] + 1  [x (1  x)]
for player 1, and
w2 (x; y) = (1  2)  [y (1  x)] + 2  [(1  y) y] ;
for player 2, where 0 <  < 1=2. A necessary rst-order condition for an interior
Nash equilibrium is thus
(1  1)  (1  y) + 1 (1  x) = 1x 

1  x
x
 1
for player 1, and likewise for player 2. Suppose that 1 = 2 = . Then the unique
symmetric equilibrium strategy is
xK = min

1
1 + 
; 1  

:
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Comparing a pair of altruists with common degree of altruism  to a pair of moralists
with common degree of morality  = , we note that xA = xK .
Henceforth, assume that the rst term is the smallest, that is,   = (1 + ).
Then the utility evaluated at the Nash equilibrium strategy is
wNE = [xK (1  xK)] =


(1 + )2

:
The unique symmetric Pareto-optimal strategy is still xC = 1=2, and the utility
evaluated at this strategy is wC = 4 .
Consider an innitely repeated play of this stage game, with discount factor  2
(0; 1). Perpetual cooperation, play of (xC ; xC), is sustained in subgame perfect
equilibrium by the threat of (perpetual) reversion to (xK ; xK) if and only if   K ,
where
K =
wD   wC
wD   wNE ; (17)
and wD is the maximal utility from a one-shot deviation from cooperation, that is,
wD = max
x2X
(1  )  (x=2) +   [(1  x)x] :
Solving this maximization problem, we nd that a player who would optimally deviate
from cooperation would play xDK = min fx; 1  g, where x is the unique solution
to the xed-point equation
x =
1  + [2 (1  x)]  
1  + 2 [2 (1  x)]  :
Figure 4 plots the solution as a function of , for  = 1=4 (and for   0:05).
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
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1.0
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x*
Figure 4: The optimal one-shot deviation for moralists in the repeated game.
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We proceed by considering the numerical example that we studied under altruism.
Let thus  = 0:01 and  = 1=4, and assume that  > 0:01 (which guarantees an inte-
rior solution, both for xK and xDK). We use the approximation xDK = exp (   ln 2),
indicated by the dashed curve in the diagram. This gives the approximation
wD = 2   (1  )  exp (  ln 2) +   [(1  exp (  ln 2)) exp (  ln 2)]
=

(1  ) 2  +   (1  exp (  ln 2))  exp (  ln 2) :
The condition (17) for sustainable cooperation can thus be written as
  [(1  ) 2
  +   (1  exp (  ln 2))]  exp (  ln 2)  4 
[(1  ) 2  +   (1  exp (  ln 2))]  exp (  ln 2)   (1 + ) 2 :
Figure 5 shows the right-hand side as a function of  (for   0:05) when  = 1=4.
The dashed curve is drawn for altruists with  = . We see that, for  = 1=4,
cooperation is somewhat harder to sustain between moralists than between altruists
with  = . In sum, in this numerical example cooperation is easiest to maintain
between purely self-interested individual than between altruists, and easier to sustain
between altruists than between moralists.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
kappa
delta_K
Figure 5: The critical discount factor for cooperation between moralists (solid) and
altruists (dashed) in the repeated game.
Does this qualitative result partly depend on the numerical approximation? Does
it hold for all ? In order to investigate these issues, assume that  = , and note
that A  K if and only if (1 + )wD  vD, an inequality that can be written as
  1 + 1=( 1)1   max
x2X
(1 + )  [(1  ) +  (2 (1  x))]  x: (18)
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This inequality clearly holds strictly at  = 0, and by continuity also for all  > 0
that are small enough. For  = 1, (18) holds with equality, since then it boils down
to
4   max
x2X
[(1  x)x] ;
which clearly holds by equality. See Figure 6, which shows isoquants for the di¤erence
between the right-hand and left-hand sides in (18). The thick curve is the zero
isoquant (where the inequality is an equality) and the thin curves positive isoquants
(where the inequality is slack). The diagram suggests that for every  2 (0; 1) there
exists an x 2 int (X) such that (18) holds strictly. Hence, the di¤erence between
altruism and morality is not due to the approximation of xDK .
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0
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0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
alpha
x
Figure 6: Contour map for the maximand in (18).
3.3. Preference representations. Both in the repeated prisonersdilemma and
in the repeated sharing game, we represented the players(selsh, altruistic, moral)
utility functions over behavior strategies in the repeated game as the normalized
present values of their per-period (selsh, altruistic, moral) utilities as dened over
their actions in the stage game. Is this consistent with dening their utility functions
directly in the repeated game, the game they actually play?
Consider the innitely repeated play of any symmetric two-player game in material
payo¤s with common strategy set X and material payo¤ function  : X2 ! R, and
with common discount factor  2 (0; 1). In terms of normalized present values, the
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material payo¤ function of a player using behavior strategy  in the repeated game,
when the opponent uses behavior strategy  , is then
(; ) = (1  )
1X
t=0
t (xt; yt) ;
where xt is the players own action in period t and yt the action of the opponent. The
function  is thus a selsh playersutility function in the repeated game.
First consider altruistic players. By denition, the utility function, in the repeated
game, of such a player with degree of altruism  2 [0; 1] is
V (; ) =  (; ) +   ( ; )
= (1  ) 
 1X
t=0
t  [ (xt; yt) +  (yt; xt)]
!
:
Hence, the utility function coincides with the normalized present value representation
that we used in our analysis of the prisonersdilemma and sharing game.
Secondly, for a Homo moralis player with degree of morality  2 [0; 1], the utility
function in the repeated game is, by denition,
W (; ) = (1  )  (; ) +   (; )
= (1  ) 
 1X
t=0
t  [(1  )   (xt; yt) +    (xt; xt)]
!
;
so also the repeated-games utility function of a moralist coincides with the normalized
present value representation that we used in the two games.
In sum: the additive separability over time, inherent in the very denition of payo¤
functions in repeated games, makes the di¤erence between stage-game preferences
and repeated-games preferencesimmaterial, both in the case of altruism and in the
case of morality.
4. Coordination
Suppose there are n players who simultaneously choose between two actions, A and
B. Write si 2 S = f0; 1g for the choice of individual i, where si = 1 means that
i chooses A, and si = 0 that instead B is chosen. Let the material payo¤ to an
individual from choosing A when nA others choose action A be nA  a. Likewise, let
the individuals material payo¤ from choosing B when nB others choose B be nB  b,
where 0 < b < a. Examples abound. Think of A and B as two distinct norms, with
A being the socially e¢ cient norm. We examine under which conditions the socially
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ine¢ cient norm B can be sustained in equilibrium. We will also investigate if both
norms can be simultaneously and partly sustained in heterogenous populations, in
the sense that some individuals take action A while others take action B.
Writing s i 2 Sn 1 for the strategy prole of is opponents and ui : Sn ! R for
the payo¤ function of a purely self-interested player i = 1; :::; n, we have
ui (si; s i) = asi 
X
j 6=i
sj + b (1  si) 
X
j 6=i
(1  sj) : (19)
The utility function of an altruistic player i with degree of altruism i 2 [0; 1] is
vi (si; s i) = ui (si; s i) + i 
X
j 6=i
uj (sj; s j) : (20)
Evidently the e¢ cient norm A, that is all playing A, can always be sustained as
a Nash equilibrium for arbitrarily altruistic players. But also the ine¢ cient norm B
is a Nash equilibrium. For if all others choose B, then so will any player i, no matter
how altruistic. We will now see that this last conclusion does not hold for moralists.
Consider Homo moralis players, where player i has degree of morality i 2 [0; 1].
Such a players utility function is
wi (si; s i) = Ei

ui
 
si; ~s
m
 i

; (21)
where ~sm i is a random vector in S
n 1 such that with probability mi (1  i)n m 1
exactly m 2 f0; :::; n  1g of the n   1 components of s i are replaced by si, while
the remaining components of s i keep their original values. Thanks to the linearity
of the material payo¤ function (19), the utility function wi can be written as
wi (si; s i) =
n 1X
m=0

n  1
m

mi (1  i)n m 1 
"
asi 
 
msi +
n  1 m
n  1 
X
j 6=i
sj
!
+ b (1  si) 
 
m  (1  si) + n  1 m
n  1 
X
j 6=i
(1  sj)
!#
:
The e¢ cient norm A can clearly be sustained as a Nash equilibrium, since when
all the others are playing A, individual i gets utility (n  1) a from taking action A
and
b 
n 1X
m=0

n  1
m

mi (1  i)n m 1m = b (n  1)i
from taking action B. By contrast, the ine¢ cient norm cannot be sustained for all
degrees of morality. To see this, rst suppose all individuals have the same degree
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of morality  2 (0; 1). If all the others are playing B, any individual gets utility
(n  1) b from also playing B and would get utility
a 
n 1X
m=0

n  1
m

m (1  )n m 1m = a (n  1)
from deviating to A. Hence, the ine¢ cient norm can be sustained in Nash equilibrium
if an only if   b=a.
This result shows that morality can have a qualitatively di¤erent e¤ect than al-
truism upon behavior in interactions with strategic complementarities. In the present
case of a simple coordination game, morality eliminates the ine¢ cient equilibrium if
and only if the common degree of morality  exceeds b=a. By contrast, the ine¢ cient
equilibrium is still an equilibrium under any degree of altruism. No matter how much
the parties care for each other, they always want to use the same strategy, even if this
results in a socially ine¢ cient outcome. Moralists, if su¢ ciently fervent, are partly
deontologically motivated and evaluate own acts not only in terms of their expected
consequences, given othersaction, but also in terms of what ought to be done.
We now examine heterogeneous populations. First, suppose that the coordination
game dened above is played by n > (a+ 2b) =b individuals, among which all but one
are purely self-interested and the remaining individual is a Homo moralis with degree
of morality  > b=a. Under complete information, such a game has a Nash equilibrium
in which all the self-interested play B while the unique Homo moralis plays A. In this
equilibrium, the moral player exerts a negative externality on the others  causes
partial mis-coordination. Had the moralist instead been an altruist, he would also
play B if the others do, and would thus be behaviorally indistinguishable from the
purely self-interested individuals. More generally, altruists as well as self-interested
individuals do not care about the right thing to doshould others do likewise. They
only care about the consequences for own and if altruistic othersmaterial payo¤s,
from their unilateral choice of action. By contrast, moralists care also care about what
would happen if, hypothetically, others would act like them. In coordination games,
this may cause a bandwagon e¤ect reminiscent of that shown in Granovetters (1978)
threshold model of collective action, a topic to which we now turn.
Like Granovetter, we analyze a population in which each individual faces a binary
choice and takes a certain action, say A, if and only if su¢ ciently many do likewise.
More precisely, each individual has a population threshold for taking action A. Our
model of coordination can be recast in these terms. Indeed, for each individual
i = 1; 2; :::; n, dened by his personal degree of morality i 2 [0; 1], one can readily
determine the minimum number of other individuals who must take action A before
he is willing to do so. Consider any player is choice. If he expects ~n 2 f0; :::; n  1g
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others to take action B, then his utility from taking action B is
wi (0; s i) = b 
n 1X
m=0

n  1
m

mi (1  i)n m 1

n  1 m
n  1  (n  ~n  1) +m

= b  [(n  ~n  1) + ~ni]
while from taking action A it is
wi (1; s i) = a 
n 1X
m=0

n  1
m

mi (1  i)n m 1

n  1 m
n  1  ~n+m

= a  [~n+ (n  ~n  1)i] :
Hence, individual i will take action A if and only if
a
b
 n  ~n  1 + ~ni
~n+ (n  ~n  1)i ;
or
~n
n  1 
b  ia
(1  i) (a+ b) :
In other words, whenever individual i expects the population share x = ~n=(n   1)
of others taking action A to exceed (respectively, fall short of) his or her threshold
i 2 R, where
i =
b  ia
(1  i) (a+ b) ;
he/she takes action A (respectively B). We note that the threshold of an individual is
strictly decreasing in the individuals degree of morality. Moreover, individuals with
high enough degrees of morality have negative thresholds, and will thus take action
A even alone. The threshold of an individual with zero degree of morality, that is,
Homo oeconomicus, is b=(a+ b).
Figure 7 below shows the threshold as a function of i for di¤erent values of
v = a=b, and with population shares (in percentages) on the vertical axis. Starting
from the bottom, the curves are drawn for v = 4, v = 2, v = 1:5, and v = 1:2. The
bottom curve, the one for v = 4, shows that an individual with degree of morality
 = 0:25 is willing to switch from B to A even if nobody else switches, an individual
with degree of morality  = 0:1 is willing to make this switch if 14% of the others
also switch, etc. This curve also reveals that as long as there is at least 20% who
are su¢ ciently moral, and thus willing to switch even if nobody else does, or only a
small number have switched, then a bandwagon e¤ect among myopic individuals will
eventually lead the whole population to switch, step by step, even if as many as 80%
of the individuals are driven by pure self interest.
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Figure 7: Thresholds for switching to A, as a function of the degree of morality, in a
population of size n = 100.
Let F be any continuous cumulative distribution function (CDF) on R such that
for every i 2 R, F (i) is the population share of individuals with thresholds not
above i. Then F : R ! [0; 1] is a continuous representation of the cumulative
threshold distribution in the population, with F (0)  0 and F (x) = 1 for all x 
b= (a+ b). By Bolzanos intermediate-value theorem, F (x) = x for at least one
x 2 X = [0; 1].11 Let X  [0; 1] be the non-empty and compact set of such xed
points.
Figure 8 below shows three di¤erent CDFs. The two dashed curves represent
relatively heterogenous populations, and those curves have one intersection with the
diagonal, and hence the unique xed point then is x = 1. The solid curve repre-
sents a relatively homogeneous population and this distribution function has three
intersections with the diagonal, and thus three xed points; one close to zero, an-
other near 0.45, and the third one being x = 1. All xed points are Nash equilibria
in a continuum population, and are approximate Nash equilibria in nite but large
populations. In the diagram, all xed points except the one near 0.45 have index +1.
Those equilibria are stable in plausible population dynamics, while the xed point
near 0.45 has index -1 and is dynamically unstable.12
11To see this, let  (x) = F (x)  x for all x 2 [0; 1], and note that  is continuous with  (0)  0
and  (1)  0.
12A xed point has index +1 if the curve y = F (x) intersects the diagonal, y = x, from above.
In general, an index of +1 usually implies strong forms of dynamic stability, while an index of -1
usually implies instability, see McLennan (2016), and the references therein, for recent discussions
and analyses of index theory in economics and game theory.
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Figure 8: Fixed points for coordination in morally heterogeneous populations.
Figure 8 can be used for discussion of dynamic scenarios. Suppose that initially
all individuals were to take action B. All those with non-positive thresholds  (that
is, with relatively high morality) would immediately switch to A. If others see this,
then the most moral among them (that is, those with lowest threshold) will follow
suit. Depending on population size and its morality distribution, this process may
go on until the population shares taking action A reaches or surpasses b= (a+ b), at
which point all remaining individuals will switch to A. This is what may happen in
a relatively heterogeneous population with morality distribution such that there is
only one xed point, which then necessarily is x = 1. By contrast, in a relatively
homogenous population with smallest xed point x < 1, once the adjustment process
reaches the point where the population share taking action A is x, the process will
either halt or switch back and forth close to x. Hence, the population may get stuck
there. Had it instead started somewhere above the middle xed point, it could lead
the population gradually towards norm A and nally jump to that norm.
A discrete-time version of this process is as follows. Consider a situation in which
initially only strategy B exists, so that initially everybody plays B. Suddenly, strat-
egy A appears, the interpretation being that it is discovered or invented. For each
threshold number of individuals ~n 2 f0; 1; 2; :::n  1g, let g (~n) be the number of
individuals who have that threshold. If g (0) = 0, then nobody ever switches to A.
But if g (0) > 0, the number of individuals N (t) who have switched from B to A at
time t = 1; 2; :::, where t denotes the number of time periods after strategy A was
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discovered, we have N (1) = g (0), and
N (t) =
N(t 1)X
j=0
g (j) :
for all t > 1. The process stops before everybody has switched if there exists some t
such that N (t+ 1) = N (t), i.e., if
N(t)X
j=N(t 1)
g (j) = 0:
Otherwise, it goes on until the whole population has switched to the e¢ cient norm. In
this process Homo moralis act as leaders, because they are willing to lead by example.
By contrast, altruists as well as self-interested individuals do not care about the right
thing to do, should others follow their lead. They care about own material payo¤, as
well as that of others for altruists, given what the others do. Hence, the cascading
e¤ect obtained with moral individuals does not obtain in groups of altruists or self-
interested people. We illustrate with two examples, both in which n = 100. The
following table shows the distribution of the thresholds. In the rst example, a total
of 21 individuals switch, and this takes four periods. In the second example, all
individuals have switched after six periods, in spite of a slower start. Indeed, in
the rst example, we have N (1) = 5, N (2) = 5 + 7 = 12, N (3) = 12 + 6 = 18,
N (4) = 18+3 = 21, but since the remaining individuals require at least 22 people to
have switched before them, they do not switch. In the second example, the process
starts with just one individual switching, N (1) = 1, but then N (2) = 5, N (3) = 10,
N (4) = 16, N (5) = 32, N (6) = 100.
TABLE 1
g (0) 5
g (4) 7
g (9) 6
g (14) 3
g (22) 10
g (23) 11
g (24) 12
g (25) 13
g (26) 14
g (27) 19
g (0) 1
g (1) 4
g (4) 5
g (8) 6
g (12) 7
g (16) 9
g (18) 10
g (20) 11
g (22) 13
g (23) 15
g (26) 19
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5. Concluding remarks
Altruism and morality are considered virtues in almost all societies and religions
worldwide. We do not question this here. Instead, we ask whether altruism and
morality help improve the material welfare properties of equilibria in strategic inter-
actions. Our analysis reveals a complex picture; sometimes altruism and morality
have benecial e¤ects, sometimes altruism is better than morality, sometimes the
reverse is true, sometimes they are equivalent, and sometimes self-interest is best!
The commonly held presumption that altruism and morality always lead to better
outcomes is thus not generally valid. Our analysis unveiled two non-trivial and po-
tentially important phenomena that we believe are robust and general. However,
before attacking these two phenonema, we showed that in canonical and one-shot
public-goods games with arbitrary many participants, altruism and morality are be-
haviorally undistinguishable and lead to unambiguously increase material welfare in
equilibrium. We also showed that altruism and morality induce di¤erent behaviors
and outcomes in simple 2  2 games. With these observations as a back-drop, we
turned to the above-mentioned two phenomena.
The rst phenomenon is that it may be more di¢ cult to sustain long-run cooper-
ation in innitely repeated interactions between altruists and moralists than between
egoists. More specically, we showed this for innitely repeated prisonersdilemmas
and innitely repteated sharing games, in both cases focussing on repeated-games
strategies based on the threat of perpetual play of the state-game Nash equilib-
rium. While altruists and moralists are less tempted to deviate from cooperation
and less prone to punish each other an altruist internalizes the pain inicted upon
the opponent and a moralist internalizes what would happen if both were to devi-
ate simultaneously the stage-game Nash equilibrium between altruists and between
moralists results in higher material payo¤s than between self-interested players. This
renders the punishment following a deviation less painful, both for the deviator and
for the punisher. In the stage games considered here, the latter e¤ect is always
strong enough to outweigh the former, so that both altruism and morality worsen
the prospects for long-run social e¢ ciency. More extensive analyses are called for in
order to investigate whether this result obtains for other stage-games and punishment
strategies (see e.g. Mailath and Samuelson, 2006).
The second phenomenon is that morality, but not altruism, can eliminate socially
ine¢ cient equilibria in coordination games. More precisely, while Homo moralis pref-
erences have the potential to eliminate socially ine¢ cient equilibria, neither self in-
terest nor altruism can. The reason is that while a Homo moralis is partly driven
by the right thingto do (in terms of the material payo¤s if others were to follow
his behavior), a self-interested or altruistic individual is solely driven by what others
actually do, and hence has no incentive to unilaterally deviate from an ine¢ cient equi-
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librium. We also showed that when coordination games are played in heterogeneous
populations, individuals with a high degree of morality, even if acting myopically, may
initiate population cascades away from ine¢ cient equilibria towards a more e¢ cient
social norm. In such cascades, the most morally motivated take the lead and are
followed by less morally motivated individuals and may nally be followed even by
purely self-interested individuals (when su¢ ciently many others have switched).
Advances in behavioral economics provide economists with richer and more real-
istic views of human motivation. Sound policy recommendations need to be based
on such more realistic views. Otherwise, the recommendations are bound to fail, and
may even be counter-productive. Our results show how altruism and morality may
a¤ect behavior and welfare in a few, but arguably canonical, strategic interactions.
Clearly, much more theoretical and empirical work is needed for a fuller understanding
to be reached, and we hope that this paper can serve as an inspiration.
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